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Abstract 
Sovereignty is a doctrine of power that constitutes and vests supreme political 
power in the state, including criminal lawmaking power. However, this 
supreme power of exercising coercive state power through the criminal law is 
not unlimited. Because the justifications for sovereignty are also justifications 
for criminal lawmaking power of the state, they are discussed together. After 
presenting the justification and legitimacy of sovereignty and the criminal 
lawmaking power of the sovereign, this article discusses criminalization power 
of the state in three parts: the limitation inherent in the notion of sovereignty, in 
constitutionalism and the bill of rights. Finally, it reviews the practice of 
criminalisation in Ethiopia. 
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_____________ 
Introduction 
The state is the highest form of socio-political organisation. Sovereignty is 
another political devise in this organisation, and some even contend that it is one 
form of organisation. Intuitively understood, sovereignty is the supreme power 
of the state. However, sovereignty is a social construct meant to represent the 
legitimate power exercised by the state, not the naked power. Stated directly, 
sovereignty is an instrumental concept justifying the power exercised by the 
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state; and embedded in the doctrine of sovereignty is legitimacy. Legitimacy 
refers to not only the power that is exercised by the state, but also the very 
creation of the state itself. Authorities have endeavoured to establish the 
foundational legitimacy of the state.  
The exercise of coercive power by the state is justified by the doctrine of 
sovereignty. One such coercive power is criminalisation, declaring conducts 
criminal and attaching punishments for violation of such norms whether it is 
fine, imprisonment or death. However, such power is not unlimited. It is limited 
in the doctrine of sovereignty itself; it is also limited by the law. The exercise of 
sovereign power and its legitimacy is justified in and by a constitution. As the 
very notion of a constitution is associated with limited government, the 
criminalising power of the government is limited in the constitution.  
Such limitation takes both structural and substantive forms. The structural 
form is accomplished in two ways: the first is the institutional structure in the 
form of separation of power among the three branches of the government 
relating to their respective jurisdiction, and the second is the normative 
structure. The substantive limitation on the power of the government is 
incorporated in the form of the bill of rights and other constitutional principles 
that guide the legislature and the body conducting constitutional litigation.  
The bill of rights puts restriction on the legislative power through both the 
adjudicative and legislative processes. In the adjudication process, fundamental 
rights are treated as principles. Principles are optimisation commands to be 
realised to the maximum as facts and norms permit; where there is a collision 
between the various principles, the conflict is to be resolved through a weighing 
process; fundamental rights are principles that necessarily are taken into 
consideration. However, those constitutional norms also include principles 
which may be called normative judgments that require balancing in case of 
conflict of values. Democracy requires that every relevant conflicting interest be 
taken into consideration and all contradictory choices are decided by majority. 
The weighing of those conflicting values is governed by the principle of 
proportionality. 
This article enquires into whether the sovereign power of criminalisation of 
the state is unlimited. Section 1 attempts to describe the notion of sovereignty as 
a politico-legal technique in the social organisation, the state. It discusses the 
scope and source of sovereignty. It depicts the concept as a social construct and 
as an instrument of „the powerful‟ in the social structure, along with restrictions 
to such power inherent in the doctrine itself.  Section 2 deals with the notion of 
legitimacy in the framework of sovereignty. As it is logically difficult to 
establish foundational legitimacy of the state or sovereignty, the alternative 
approach is moving the argument to the second level legitimacy, legitimacy of 
state action, including legislation as a method of limiting criminalisation.  
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The notions of sovereignty and legitimacy are discussed in the context of a 
constitution. Section 3 therefore deals with constitution and constitutionalism 
incorporating both structural and substantive limitations to the power of the 
state. Legitimacy is about the exercise of sovereign authority. Section 4 
discusses criminalisation, doctrinal and structural limitations to criminalisation 
inherent in the criminal law itself. The substantive limitations to the power of 
the state are fundamental rights. The substantive limitations of the coercive 
power of the state both in the context of adjudication as well as legislation are 
discussed in section 5. Section 6 illustrates the justification and practice of 
criminalisation in Ethiopia. 
1. The Doctrine of Sovereignty: Overview 
The state is the modern politico-social structure invented by society; and 
sovereignty is an aspect of such modern state. For Kriegel, it is a “doctrine of 
power;” it “is the form that gives being to the state; it is inseparable from the 
state; without it, the sate vanishes”.1 Although the doctrine of state sovereignty 
dominates our legal and political theory and practice, there is little agreement 
regarding the description of the nature of the legal-political doctrine. 
Sovereignty, holds Lutz, “is a constitutional order that marries justice with 
power in such a way as to tame that power and turn it to the service of civil 
society”.2  
Likewise, Kriegel considered sovereignty as “the state under the rule of law;” 
as a “legitimate, rational and responsible exercise of power”.3 The state, in her 
opinion, is “a legal, institutional and moral construct” that cannot be reduced 
into “economic or social interests” as was done by Marx and his followers.4 Nor 
can the state “be identified with despotism” as some governments would like 
to.5 Coming after the collapse of feudalism, Kriegel describes sovereignty as 
                                           
1
 B Kriegel (1989), The State and the Rule of Law (Marc A. LePain and   Jeffrey C. Cohen 
Translation, 1995.) at 15. [citations omitted.] 
2
 DS Lutz (2006), Principles of Constitutional Design (Cambridge University Press) at 26. 
3
 Kriegel, supra note 1, at 17. 
4
 Id., at 27. For instance, Marx and his followers argue that the state which operates as an 
instrument of oppression would wither away . 
5
 Blandine Kriegel‟s argument is that despotism is not sovereignty. She contends that “the 
classical state did not function in ways that a despotic state did. The former did not control 
its intellectuals nor transform them into mercenaries. […] it established research 
institutions, thereby running the enormous risks of critique and opposition, and subjecting 
its power, de facto, to law.” Id., at 7. Often, the classical writers were critical of the 
government of their time. Their greatest challenge had come from the church, not from the 
state. When they display such extra-ordinary intellectual quality, they would be appointed 
to high offices or would be given great responsibilities. However, Kriegel also argues that 
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“peace,” not naked power.6 There are also those who see sovereignty otherwise. 
For instance, Pusterla asserts that the notion of sovereignty is “an organised 
hypocrisy”7 because the existence of sovereignty is taken as evident simply for a 
lack of evidence, as “a simple act of faith”, or “a belief in a fiction”.8  
We cannot define the notion of sovereignty as though it is physically „out 
there‟; nor can we fully explain the relation between sovereignty and power; but 
we can only describe how it operates within the framework of the notion of state 
and how it is skilfully used by those in power. There is a general agreement that 
sovereignty is a social construct and some may argue that it is a delegated 
power.9 The designation of the word and the referent are always subjects of 
debate as the content, scope and source of sovereignty is constantly evolving. 
There appears to be a general consensus that the doctrine of sovereignty is an 
instrumental concept that institutionalises the „ultimate‟ or „supreme political 
power‟ in an entity, such as, the modern state.10 The statist notion of sovereignty 
is paradigmatically thought in the context of the state11 that sovereignty and 
state mutually explain each other.12 
1.1 The state and sovereignty  
Sovereignty is having and exercising “supreme political power” domestically 
without external interference.13 The doctrine of sovereignty is almost exclusively 
manifested in the exercise of authority by such entity as the state to the extent 
                                                                                                            
the doctrine of sovereignty is „opening the door‟ to despotism, because there is a “slippery 
slope from the sovereign state to the totalitarian state.” Id., at 16. 
6
 Id., at 18, 21-24. Sovereignty is antithesis of feudalism in that “it was not based on military 
power, and it was not a dominium, because it did not institute a relation of subjugation. 
…the sovereign is not a creature of war but rather of peace, and that it prefers pacific 
negotiation of rights to the clamour of arms.” Id., at 21. 
7 
ERG Pusterla (2016), The Credibility of Sovereignty – The Political Fiction of a Concept 
(Springer) at 2, 10. 
8
 Id., at 5, 9, 31. 
9 
Lutz also states that “constitutionalism has emerged as the best technology, the best human 
invention for organizing society. … Sovereignty is itself a part of political technology that 
has come to be known as constitutionalism.” Lutz, supra note 2, at 27.  He argues that such 
creation of the notion of sovereignty is guided by two brute facts – the human desire to 
survive in liberty and freedom, and the need for human institutions. Id., at 28-30. Also, see 
his discussion on „popular sovereignty‟, at 73. Likewise, Biersteker and Weber contend 
that sovereignty is “an inherently social concept.” [emphasis in the original]. It is “socially 
constructed, as in the modern state system.” TJ Biersteker and C Weber (1996), “The 
Social Construction of State Sovereignty” in TJ Bierstekerand C Weber (eds), State 
Sovereignty as Social Construct (Cambridge University Press) at 1, 3, 11 ff. 
10 
Lutz, supra note 2, at 32, 34. 
11 
Id., at 31, 35. 
12 
Kriegel, supra note 1, at 15. 
13 
Lutz, supra note 2, at 27. 
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we could not see a distinction between law and violence.14 Such monopoly of 
the coercive power of the state is manifested in tax law, criminal law and 
conscription.15 It is also the power to sanction private relationships, such as, 
recognition of marriage and enforcement of contracts. In the exercise of such 
sovereign and exclusive coercive power, the state has the authority to make laws 
and establish institutions to enforce them.  
Often, the elements of state are also discussed as elements of the doctrine of 
sovereignty that there does not seem to be distinction between the notions of 
state and sovereignty because they are inextricably linked.16 For instance, a state 
may be recognised as sovereign when it has a territory, and population on which 
a certain group claiming recognition also exercises effective control – 
authority.17 The fine distinction made by Biersteker and Weber is that the state 
is „an identity‟ while sovereignty is „an institution‟18 that sovereignty “links … 
the state to practice”.19 
1.2. Justifications for sovereignty  
Society organises itself for a better protection of its interests, whatever the 
content of such interests may be.20 It is often argued that, such organisation 
whether it is under a strongman or a modern politico-social structure, such as, 
                                           
14
 Lutz argues that the reason why sovereignty is the preferred descriptor of the notion of 
supreme power is that it “implies the minimal use of force and violence and, thereby 
minimal injustice.” Lutz, supra note 2, at 32. Pusterla, on the other hand, states that it is 
“the point of indistinction between violence and law, the threshold on which violence 
passes over into law and law passes over into violence.” [citations omitted] Pusterla, 
supra note 7, at 1. 
15
 BM Leiser (2008), “On Coercion” in DA Reidy and WJ Riker (eds), Coercion and the 
State (Springer) at 37. 
16 
Biersteker and Weber, supra note 9, at 8, 11. 
17 
Id., at 2, 11. Kriegel, supra note 1, at 29-31. 
18
 Biersteker and Weber, supra note 9, at 11. 
19
 Id., at 12. Wintgens referred to sovereignty as „black box‟ to describe the indispensable 
nature of sovereignty as a source of power as well as the confusion surrounding it. LJ 
Wintgens (2007), “Legitimacy and Legitimation from the Legisprudential Perspective” in 
LJ Wintgens (ed), Legislation in Context: Essays in Legisprudence(Ashgate Publishing at 
30 ff.; LJ Wintgens, (2012) , Legisprudence: Practical Reason in Legislation (Ashgate 
Publishing) at 212 - 214. 
20 
In classical writings, the two rights, sometimes called natural rights, that were said to be in 
want of protection were property rights and liberty (personal security). See, for instance, 
Kriegel, supra note 1, at 21-25. J Dunn  (2013), “Legitimacy and Democracy in the World 
Today” in J Tankebe and A Liebling (eds), Legitimacy and Criminal Justice: An 
International Exploration (Oxford University Press) at 11, 12. 
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the state, it is meant to promote the „common good‟ of its members.21 One such 
theory of the justification and legitimation of the creation of the state is the 
social contract theory which had been the secular source of justification for the 
existence of the state.22 However, in several recent critiques, the social contract 
theory is challenged for the lack of actual and unanimous consent.23 This 
challenge is both on the procedure and the substance of the theory.24 
Barnett argues that there is no actual and unanimous consent in the social 
contract; nor would the opportunity to vote, residence, or acquiescence 
constitute or substitute consent.25 Therefore, in search of other justifications, the 
circumstances that were said to exist at a particular moment in history could be 
explained by a „coordination theory‟.26 This theory upholds that the foundation 
of the constitution is not our consent, which is a positive assent; it is rather 
acquiescence to the existing convention for lack of effective coordination of 
opposition to the constitution.27 In this theory, the minority‟s interests are better 
protected under the existing constitutional framework because it is so costly to 
organise an opposition.28 
As is always the case, the theories were developed as an ex post facto 
justification for power. Thus, the source of sovereignty appears to have failed 
the foundational legitimacy. Hume holds that almost “all the governments which 
exist [...]have been founded originally either upon usurpation or conquest, or 
                                           
21
 A Bhagwat (2010), The Myth of Rights: The Purposes and Limits of Constitutional Rights 
(Oxford University Press) at 48; Lutz, supra note 2, at 23, 24. This notion of „common 
good‟ pushed Beccaria to develop the doctrine which later is named by Bentham to be 
utilitarianism, “the greatest happiness shared among the greater number.” C Beccaria, On 
Crimes and Punishments and Other Writings (R Bellamy ed, 1995) at 7. P Riley (1982), 
Will and Political Legitimacy: A Critical Exposition of Social Contract Theory in Hobbes, 
Locke, Rousseau, Kant, and Hegel, Harvard University Press, at 3, 5. 
22
 Beccaria opines that the social contract theory is not only the justification for the existence 
of the state but also for the use of coercive state power. He argued that “the foundation of 
the sovereign‟s right to punish crimes [is] the necessity of defending the repository of the 
public well-being from the usurpations of individuals” which “compelled them to give up 
a part of their freedom.” Beccaria, supra note 21, at 7, 9, 11. 
23
 RE Barnett  (2003),  “Constitutional Legitimacy”, 103 Colum L Rev 111, at 115-118. 
24
 Procedurally, unanimity of consent is an impossible condition; substantively, there may, at 
least, be one person that would oppose the proposition. In fact, Hardin thoroughly 
discusses why the social contract theory actually is not a contract as we properly 
understand it. R Hardin “Constitutionalism” in B Weingast and DA Wittman (eds), 2006, 
The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, Oxford University Press, at 291-293. 
25
 Barnett, supra note 23, at 115-127. 
26
 Hardin, supra note 24, at 297. Wintgens examined it as part of a trading-off in the 




 Id., at 298. 
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both, without any pretence of a fair consent or voluntary subjection of the 
people”.29 Thus, aligned with Kant‟s hypothetical consent, Rawls established his 
principles of justice for the establishment of a “well-ordered and just society” in 
which the coercive intervention of the state is justified.30 His is not about the 
foundational legitimacy of the constitution; it is rather a subsequent legitimation 
of state conduct based on the principles of equality of opportunity.31 
In his theory of law and state, Kelsen, on the other hand, argues that, law and 
power are two sides of a coin; and one cannot exist without the other.32 The 
primary rule is authorising certain conduct and the secondary rule is providing 
for a sanction for its violation. The law gets its validity from its superior law. 
But at the top is the constitution as a grundnorm, the only presupposition.33 
Following his argument, the „social contract‟ is the justification for sovereignty. 
In this notion of sovereignty, the supreme power is that of the state not a 
particular group or individual.  
The social contract theory as discussed above holds true for other 
constitutional jurisdictions because those documents claim to have been adopted 
by „the people‟ of those countries.34 In Ethiopia‟s case, sovereignty is a 
relatively new concept and the constitutions do not invoke public authority. The 
first written constitution was „granted‟ in 1931 by Emperor Haile Selassie I to 
                                           
29
 Hume quoted by Riley, supra note 21, at 248, note 7.  Hardin, supra note 24, at 299. 
Kelsen agrees to this statement. H Kelsen, Introduction to Problems of Legal Theory (BL 
Paulson and SL Paulson, Translation: 1992) at 57.  
30
 Rawls‟s theory of justice is social justice regulating „a well-ordered society‟ based on two 
„original principles of justice‟. The first is the hypothetical „the original position,‟ where 
individuals possess liberty and equality. Rawls equates this principle with the state of 
nature. The second is, the principle of justice is selected behind „a veil of ignorance‟, i.e., 
no one knows his position in society so that no one is (dis)advataged. Once the principles 
of justice are agreed upon, laws and institutions are to be established based on this 
principle, and coercion may be employed in order to maintain such just institution. J 
Rawls (1990), A Theory of Justice (Revised Edition, Harvard University Press). 
31
 Rawls discuses equality of opportunity in greater detail and in different context. His 
conclusion is that society is fair only if the least advantage is well off. Ibid.; AM Macleod 
“Coercion, Justice, and Democracy” in Reidy and Riker (eds), supra note 15, at 67, 68; J 
Elster “Constitutional Bootstrapping in Philadelphia and Paris” in M Rosenfeld 
(ed),Constitutionalism, Identity, Difference, and Legitimacy: Theoretical Perspectives 
(Duke University Press, 1994) at 64. 
32
 M La Torre (2010), Law as Institution (Springer) at 26-29.  
33
 H Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (M Knight Trans., 1967) at 221-224. H Kelsen, General 
Theory of Law and State (A Wedberg Trans., 1949) at 258-259. Kelsen (1992) supra note 
29, at 57, 58. 
34 
The US constitution begins with the clause “We the people of the United States of 
America…”  
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his „subjects‟ and the Emperor is recognised to be a sovereign, „elect of God.‟ 
As such, the constitution recognises the Emperor as the sovereign; not the 
people. The 1955 Revised Constitution maintained that „tradition‟ because 
sovereignty is attached to the crown not to the people or the nation.35 The 
subsequent constitutions made the power closer to the people but they kept it 
„abstract‟ that the notion appears to be of less use to the public than it is for the 
elite. The Constitution of the People‟s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 
Proclamation No 1, 1987 („the PDRE Constitution‟), provides that sovereignty 
belongs to “the working people”.36 
The Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 
Proclamation No 1/1995 („the FDRE Constitution‟), on its part, claims to be the 
product of agreement of “the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia” 
and attaches sovereignty to them.37 It is further provided that the “Constitution is 
an expression of their sovereignty” which “shall be expressed through their 
representatives elected in accordance with [the] Constitution and through their 
direct democratic participation.”38 
Whether the Ethiopian constitutional order is said to be a product of „social 
contract‟ or otherwise, the doctrine of social contract is effectively challenged 
from becoming a justification for legitimacy of the state.  Nor can it legitimize 
the constitution. None of our constitutions refer to the individual in the making 
of the constitution but as subject of the constitution. The ground of legitimacy of 
the constitution in Ethiopia is as vague as it has ever been. Yet, these 
constitutions also have another aspect in that they appeal to natural law. For 
                                           
35
 Article 1 provides that “The Empire of Ethiopia comprises all the territories, including the 
islands and the territorial waters, under the sovereignty of the Ethiopian Crown. Its 
sovereignty and territory are indivisible. Its territories and the sovereign rights therein are 
inalienable. All Ethiopian subjects, whether living within or without the Empire, 
constitute the Ethiopian people.” 
36
 This is provided for twice in the preamble, as well as under Art 3. The Constitution under 
Art 1(1) appears to define the “working people” as “workers and peasants and the [...] 
intelligentsia, the revolutionary army, artisans and other democratic sections of society.” 
37
 The FDRE Constitution, Art 8. The preamble states that the Constitution is ratified by “the 
Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia.” The Preamble of the Constitution begins 
with the clause “We, the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia…”. Art 8(1) 
Provides that “All sovereign power resides in the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of 
Ethiopia.” The reference to “Nations, Nationalities and Peoples” is defined (for the 
purpose of exercising their right to self-determination but which, unavoidably be extended 
to other purposes) under Art 39(5) to be “a group of people who have or share a large 
measure of a common culture or similar customs, mutual intelligibility of language, belief 
in a common or related identities, a common psychological make-up, and who inhabit an 
identifiable, predominantly contiguous territory.” 
38
 Id., Art 8(2) and (3). 
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instance, the FDRE Constitution recognises that there are “human rights and 
freedoms emanating from the nature of mankind” rejecting legal positivism.39 
1.3. Sovereignty and its elements as social constructs 
It is agreed that like many grand legal-political doctrines, sovereignty is also a 
social construct. The difference is the vantage point we look at it from. For 
instance, when Pusterla –as stated above– holds that sovereignty is an 
“organised hypocrisy,” it is from the perspective of Swiss authorities‟ claim of 
sovereignty in the face of deep integration with the European Union.40 Likewise, 
when Biersteker and Weber hold that sovereignty is a „social construct,‟ they 
mean both from the international and the domestic perspective. In further 
elaboration, they examine the elements constituting the doctrine, each of which, 
they hold, are socially constructed.41 
1.3.1 Territory of the sovereign state 
In international relations, sovereignty becomes complete upon recognition of a 
state by other states.42 A state would extend recognition to another state if that 
other state has defined territory, the only tangible element. Territory is 
negotiated and renegotiated; thus, it is a social construct.43 For Africa, the issue 
requires no further comment than to mention the division of Africa based on the 
1884 Berlin conference; or the recent secession of South Sudan from the Sudan, 
and that of Eritrea from Ethiopia, redefining the territories of Sudan and 
Ethiopia, respectively. For instance, China obliges states dealing with her to, 
first, recognise Taiwan forms part of the mainland China. A case in point is 
China‟s pressure on US President-elect Donald Trump so that US „One-China‟ 
policy would be sustained under his presidency.44 
1.3.2.The people of the sovereign state 
Recognition is extended to an organised population inhabiting such territory. 
Because the identity of any nation is always under constant evolution, such 
population is manipulated and socially constructed.45 The group that is in power 
                                           
39
 Id., Art 10(1). 
40
 Pusterla, supra note 7, at 3-10. 
41
 Biersteker and Weber, supra note 9, at 3 ff. 
42
 Id., at 12. Kelsen (1949), supra note 33, at 219 - 225. 
43
 Biersteker and Weber, supra note 9, at 13. 
44
 The Taiwanese President called President-elect Donald Trump to congratulate him on his 
getting elected for which China lodged a formal complaint with the US over Trump‟s 
accepting the call. Trump later assured China that he would continue the US „One-China‟ 
policy.  
45
 Biersteker and Weber, supra note 9, at 13. Kelsen (1949), supra note 33, at 233 - 241. For 
in-depth discussion on how population is socially constructed, see M Barnett 
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defines its identity and that of the „other‟ governing through its immigration 
law, the laws of nationality, manners of recognition of language, culture and 
other manifestations of identity, which are not new to Ethiopia. Of course, the 
constitution is the “normative self-construction” of a given society.46 For 
instance, the PDRE Constitution appears to be promoting the “working people” 
identity.47 The FDRE Constitution, on the other hand, promotes ethnic identity 
based on “Nations, Nationalities and Peoples”.48 In both cases, the individual is 
lost in forming sovereignty but it is the subject of the laws of the nation. The 
Ethiopian people at one time in political history is different from the one in 
another regime because each wanted to construct a type of people that suits its 
political ideology. Thus, those who do not want to identify themselves with the 
identity promoted by the state would not benefit in the distribution of wealth and 
benefits.49 
                                                                                                            
“Sovereignty, nationalism, and regional order in the Arab states system” in Biersteker and 
Weber, supra note 9. Comaroff and Comaroff discuss construction of identity as part of 
the instrumentality of law. JL Comaroff and J Comaroff, “Reflections on the Anthropology 
of Law, Governance and Sovereignty” in F von Benda-Beckmann, K von Benda-
Beckmann and J Eckert (eds), 2009, Rules of Law and Laws of Ruling: On the 
Governance of Law, Ashgate, at 40 ff.  
46
 C Thornhill (2011), A Sociology of Constitutions: Constitutions and State Legitimacy in 
Historical Perspective, (Cambridge University Press) at 10. The PDRE Constitution Art 
31(1) provides that “any person with both or one parent of Ethiopian citizenship is an 
Ethiopian.” The FDRE Constitution has identical provision under Art 6(1). However, Art 
33 appears to have confused matters. Sub-art (1) provides that “no Ethiopian national 
shall be deprived of his or her Ethiopian nationality against his or her will. Marriage of an 
Ethiopian national of either sex to a foreign national shall not annul his or her Ethiopian 
nationality.” Sub-art (2) further provides that “every Ethiopian national has the right to the 
enjoyment of all rights, protections and benefits derived from Ethiopian nationality as 
prescribed by law.” Contrary to the provision of Art 6(1), however, the Ethiopian 
Nationality Proclamation No 378/2003, Art 20(1) provides that “any Ethiopian national 
who voluntarily acquires another nationality shall be deemed to have voluntarily 
renounced his Ethiopian nationality.”  
47
 PDRE Constitution, Art 9 provides that “the State shall advance the material and cultural 
development of the working people, which is the primary objective of the economic 
construction.” Art 10(1) further provides that “the State shall ensure […] the conservation 
and development of natural resources […and] it shall guarantee their utilisation for the 
benefit of the working people.” On the other hand, it proudly states the nationalisation of 
“rural land, urban land and extra houses, and major enterprises of production, distribution 
and services,” (Preamble, para 9, Arts 12, 13).  
48
 The Preamble of the FDRE Constitution asserts that it is a pact among “the Nations, 
Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia.” Art 8 vests “all sovereign power” on them. Art 39 
further recognises their “unconditional right to self-determination”, and Art 43 states their 
“Right to Development.”  
49
 The PDRE Constitution classifies people into “working people”, on the one hand, and 
“feudal”, “anti-revolutionary and anti-socialist imperialist and reactionary forces” on the 
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1.3.3 Exercising authority in the territory and recognition by other states 
In order to acquire recognition, the group in power must exercise such authority 
over the population in that territory.50 There are varying degrees of authority but 
it is the supreme authority in the territory with no other competing authority that 
embodies the prize of sovereignty. This authority is socially constructed,51 and 
as already indicated, the allocation of benefits and exercise of authority is done 
based on the identity promoted by the state. The fact that the three elements are 
present does not warrant sovereignty. The real deal is recognition by other states 
which is dominated by western political culture. In fact, it is even related to 
political economy.52 It is good enough to mention the state of Palestine or 
Somaliland, and until recently, Federal Government of Somalia. The „state‟ of 
Palestine has been there for more than the state of Israel. It met all the basic 
criteria for statehood but it is not recognised as a state.53 State recognition is 
governed by state practice, which is guided by national interest.54 
Thus, the overall content of sovereignty is an exercise of domestic authority 
and external independence, which is the non-interference of other states in the 
affairs of a given state on matters which are considered „domestic affairs‟ of that 
                                                                                                            
other hand. In fact, there were penal provisions that fit into those categories of people.  
See, for instance, the Special Penal Code Proclamation No 8 of 1974, Art 11, Offences 
Against the Activities of the Provisional Military Administration Council, and Art 35, 
Offences Against the Motto “Ethiopia Tikidem.” Those provisions would make sense only 
when they are read along with decisions rendered by the Special Courts-Martial. Thus, as 
soon as the PMAC came to power it detained all former regime officials for their mere 
„identity‟. Later, when the EPRDF came to power, it detained the former regime officials, 
in turn. WPE was disbanded and former members were precluded from candidacy in the 
new regime running for office. These facts show identities that were suppressed at a 
particular time in history.  
50
 Kelsen (1949), supra note 33, at 255 - 259. 
51 
Biersteker and Weber, supra note 9, at 14, 17. For in-depth discussion on how exercise of 
authority is socially constructed, see D Dewdney (1996), “Binding Sovereigns: 
Authorities, Structures, and Geopolitics in Philadelphian Systems” in Biersteker and 
Weber, supra note 9; A Wendt and D Friedheim “Hierarchy under Anarchy: Informal 
Empire and the East German State” in Biersteker and Weber (1996), supra note 9. 
52
 Biersteker and Weber, supra note 9, at 14, 15.  
53
 It is, in fact, recognised by several small western states including Sweden. Conversely, for 
discussions on how the state of Israel is created out of the Palestinian land, see LV Smith 
“Wilsonian Sovereignty in the Middle East: The King-Crane Commission Report of 
1919” in D Howland and L White (eds), The State of Sovereignty: Territories, Laws, 
Populations (Indiana University Press, 2009). 
54
 Biersteker and Weber, supra note 9, at 12. For an in-depth discussion on Eurocentric 
political economic content of recognition, see D Strang (1996), “Contested Sovereignty: 
The Social Construction of Colonial Imperialism” in Biersteker and Weber, supra note 9.  
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state. The state that has internal domestic supremacy commands the support of 
others.55 
1.4. Locating sovereignty  
Sovereignty is described as supreme political power. In the present Ethiopia, for 
instance, the holders of such sovereignty –as the Constitution provides–  are the 
Ethiopian Nation, Nationalities and Peoples, assuming they are identifiable 
group exercising their rights and prerogatives, and discharging their 
responsibilities.56 The Constitution further provides that they exercise their 
sovereignty through their representatives.57  
Exercising sovereign power is participation in the development and 
implementation of essential public policies. There is no evidence, the nations, 
nationalities and peoples participated in the development of any of those 
important policy matters, such as, macroeconomic policies or the political 
ideology the state pursues. However, in recent public discourse, the EPRDF 
Executive Committee is seen to have undertaken fundamental policy decisions 
some of which are implemented without the adoption of a legislation.58 If 
sovereignty is exercising supreme political power, it is not found where the 
                                           
55
 For instance, regarding the 1998/99 TPLF internal conflict, the International Development 
Association (IDA) President in his Report and Recommendations to the Board of 
Directors of the World Bank, states that “the EPRDF organized a process of 
consultations among party cadres through local and regional congresses, culminating -in 
September 2001- in the Fourth Organizational Congress. The wing of the party led by the 
Prime Minister emerged stronger from the infighting, endorsing a liberal and democratic 
agenda of reforms. The Report on the Fourth Congress of the EPRDF, which was shared 
with IDA, sets out the vision and strategy of the Government. It re-confirms the strategy 
articulated in the I-PRSP […]. The document also endorses a stronger process of 
economic liberalization to facilitate the progressive integration of Ethiopia into the world 
economy.” The IDA supported the Prime Minister‟s agenda and extended substantial 
loan to Ethiopia. See “Report and Recommendation of the President of the International 
Development Association to the Executive Directors on a Proposed Credit of SDR 96.2 
Million to the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia for an Ethiopia Structural 
Adjustment Credit (May 15, 2002)”, para 4.  Kriegel would call such state a “party-
state,” not a “nation state” (Kriegel, supra note 1 at xi) if it heavily depends on the 





See, supra note 37. 
57
 FDRE Const., Art 8(3). 
58
 As stated above (in the development of macroeconomic policy of the country in 
consultation with the World Bank and IMF), it is EPRDF 4th Congress that set the agenda 
and negotiated through the executive which is fully manned by EPRDF members. When 
the country was in crises, it is the Executive Committee that made the significant 
decisions, including the release of „political prisoners‟ in “order to expand the political 
space.” Reporter, Amharic Newspaper January 7, 2018, at 3.   
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Constitution claims it is; its traces are rather found elsewhere. This is probably 
because of the instrumental nature of sovereignty. 
1.5 Instrumental nature of sovereignty and who exercises power 
The third element of sovereignty is exercising authority. A group in power 
always asserts that it is exercising legitimate power –authority. It is the 
dominant group that makes a skilful use of sovereignty. In the modern nation 
state, the actions of the sovereign are supported by the law. Thus, the powerful 
group makes use of such law into its advantage that its interests are translated 
into law.59 This is how the social scientists and criminologists,60 the political 
economist,61 and the legal theorists62 see the use of law through the doctrine of 
sovereignty to the advantage of a particular group. This follows from the 
instrumental nature of the social structure, state and sovereignty. Biersteker and 
Weber succinctly state that “the ideal of state sovereignty is a product of actions 
of the powerful agents and the resistances to those actions by those located in 
the margins of power”.63 Stated otherwise, sovereignty is nothing more “than a 
convenient label” for those in power.64 
                                           
59
 Comaroff and Comaroff, supra note 45, at 32 ff. They examined the anthropology of law 
in historical context, how the law is “fetishized”, and contend that the law is the 
battleground and politics is judicialised. They blamed imperialism for „lawfare,‟ using the 
“penal powers, administrative procedures … [or any other coercive force] to discipline its 
subjects by means of violence made actual by its own sovereign word.” They further 
argue that “sovereignty” is an exercise of power. “Law-making …is power-making …but 
power [is] the principal of all lawmaking.” [citations omitted.] Id., at 36, 39. Kelley 
asserts that the state, which he also referred to as a „political reality‟, “has long been 
regarded as the medium of modern form of enslavement” based on the experience of 
historically documented authoritarian regimes. D.R. Kelley “Forward” to Kriegel, supra 
note 1, at vii. 
60
 B McSherry, A Norrie and S Bronitt (eds.) 2009, Regulating Deviance: The Redirection 
of Criminalisation and the Futures of Criminal Law, Hart Publishing; JJ Rodger (2008), 
Criminalising Social Policy: Anti-social behaviour and welfare in a de-civilised society 
(Willan Publishing); P Scraton, Power (2007), Conflict and Criminalisation (Routledge); 
HD Barlow and D Kauzlarich (2010), Explaining Crime: A Primer in Criminological 
Theory Basics of Criminological Theory (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers); GR Skoll 
(2009), Contemporary Criminology and Criminal Justice Theory: Evaluating Justice 
Systems in Capitalist Societies(Palgrave Macmillan). 
61
 Barlow and Kauzlarich, supra, elaborate Marx‟s view of law in Chapter 2, at 104-128. 
62
 BZ Tamanaha (2006), The Law as a Means to an End: Threat to the Rule of Law 
(University of Cambridge Press). 
63
 Biersteker and Weber, supra note 9, at 3. 
64
 Id., at 5. Kriegel argues that “the principle of despotic government is […] FEAR. 
Despotism exhibits political asthenia and juridical anemia, an absence of deliberation; 
power is all, politics is absent; commandments are absolute, laws are worthless; 
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To put it in perspective, the Provisional Military Administration Council 
(“PMAC”), declared itself as the government promoting the interests of the 
„working people‟ of Ethiopia.65 It criminalised anything that goes against the 
political ideology and against those who are pursuing the ideology while at the 
same time, it was doing what is criminally prohibited,66 but no one was held 
accountable while it was in power.67 Those who fought against the government 
in power were considered as criminals.68 When EPRDF came to power, the 
conducts of the previous regime turned out to be criminal for which the former 
government officials were prosecuted and sentenced; while the conducts of 
EPRDF turned out a „heroic act‟ which, if the latter had lost the fight would 
otherwise remain criminal.  
The difference between the two is exercising „sovereign authority.‟ After 
changing seats, the present government in turn criminalises membership to 
particular groups.69 It is often the case that the one in power is protected by the 
aura of sovereignty; and the conducts of the one who is not in power remains to 
be criminal until it wins the fight for power. In such violent changes of 
government, Kelsen argues, the old system ceases to be effective and the new 
system becomes effective because “the basic norm depends on [those] material 
facts creating the system to which actual behaviour … corresponds to a certain 
                                                                                                            
implacable oppression and inept administration are the order of the day.” [citations 
omitted.] Kriegel, supra note 1, at 17. 
65
 See, generally, the Provisional Military Government Establishment Proclamation No 1 of 
1974, and Definition of Powers of the Provisional Military Administration Council and Its 
Chairman, Proclamation No 2 of 1974.  
66
 It adopted a Special Penal Code (Proclamation No 8 of 1974) with retrospective 
application, Art 2(2). Also see, supra note 49, for illustrations of the types of conducts 
criminalized.  
67
 Firew Tiba “The Trial of Mengistu and Other Derg Members for Genocide, Torture and 
Summary Executions in Ethiopia” in C Murungu and J Biegon (eds), Prosecuting 
International Crimes in Africa (Pretoria University Law Press, 2011) at 163 ff. 
Girmachew Alemu Aneme “The Anatomy of Special Prosecutor v. Colonel Mengistu 
Hailemariam, et. al. (1994 – 2008)”(2009)  in  4 International  Journal of Eth Studies 1. 
68
 See, for instance, Special Penal Code, Art 45,  Political Homicide. 
69
 See, Anti-Terrorism Proclamation No 652/2009. Art 7 criminalises participation in and 
membership to a “terrorist organisation.” Whether a particular organisation is a terrorist 
organisation may be determined by the House of Peoples‟ Representatives (Art 25), a 
decision which is fundamentally political. However, while ordinary membership is 
punishable with 5 to 10 years‟ imprisonment, leadership or decision making participation 
entails “rigorous imprisonment from 20 years to life.” Until such labelling is removed 
recently, one of those organisations „labelled‟ by the HoPR as a terrorist organisation is 
Oromo Liberation Front which participated in the formation of the Transitional 
Government of Ethiopia, post-Dergue.  
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degree”.70 It is for this reason that Pusterla, as stated above, holds that 
sovereignty is „organised hypocrisy‟ because it equates „despotic domination‟ 
with „legitimate use of power‟ by confusing the distinction depending on who is 
asserting legitimacy.71 
2.  Legitimacy and ‘Limited Power’  
Kriegel describes sovereignty as “the state under the rule of law” while Lutz 
describes it as “a constitutional order that marries justice with power […] to 
serve civil society”.72 An aspect of the notion of sovereignty of the state is 
exercising authority or legitimate power. The modern understanding of 
sovereignty of state, therefore, essentially embodies legitimacy. As such, 
legitimacy is at the heart of the doctrine of sovereignty itself. However, the 
notion of legitimacy is as elusive as sovereignty itself. Legitimacy is discussed 
in relation to the creation of the state and, often, when discussed in the context 
of a constitution, it is about the exercise of authority by way of limiting such 
power. Thus, Lutz, for instance, argues that in the desire to maintain law and 
order, “the greatest temptation is to create a central power that is too strong”.73 
But he argues that while we created supreme political power, “constrained 
supreme power” has paradoxically become a “permanent fact of life”.74 
Likewise, Kriegel holds that the “doctrine of sovereignty that establishes the 
supremacy of the state and the legitimacy of this supremacy does not defend 
power without limits”.75 
2.1. The content of legitimacy  
The intuitive understanding of legitimacy is conformity of conduct to a certain 
required standard, its acceptance by the public affected (bound) by it, that, its 
outcome is correct. Beetham discusses legitimacy on three levels: the conduct 
conforms to a certain rule, or that it is normatively justifiable, and it is expressly 
affirmed or recognised by the subjects, none of which are satisfactorily argued 
                                           
70
 Kelsen (1992), supra note 29, at 59. 
71
 Pusterla, supra note 7, at 2, 10. Kriegel, supra note 1, at 3, 5. 
72
 See supra notes 2 and 3. 
73
 Lutz, supra note 2, at 32. 
74 
Id., at 33, 35. 
75
 Kriegel, supra note 1, at 32. In fact, she argues that sovereignty is a unique notion in that 
it “has the exclusive capacity to determine itself and to restrain itself from the perspective 
of the law. […] Kant‟s notion of individual morality as self-legislation by a good will is 
modelled on the politico-legal notion of sovereign power.” Ibid. 
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for how they justify the state or its coercive power.76 The scope of the discussion 
on legitimacy covers both the justifiability of the norms creating the state and 
those norms adopted by the state so created.77 Barnett describes legitimacy as 
one that “binds one in the conscience” or it carries a “moral duty” of 
obedience.78 It gives the impression that legitimacy is how the ordinary citizen 
accepts the state; it is, as contended by Raz, a relationship between a state and 
its subjects.79 However, Macleod –who does not make it clear what legitimacy 
contains– argues that legitimacy cannot be reduced to a “moral defensibility”80 
or a hypothetical consent as pursued by Kant that “a rational person would 
consent to.”81 
2.2. Foundational legitimacy of the state 
The foundational legitimacy of the state refers to the legitimacy of the state 
when transiting from state of nature to civil society. A long-accepted 
justification had been the social contract theory as the secular justification for 
the existence of the state and its use of coercive power.82 However, if the source 
of legitimacy is the social contract theory in the meaning of the „consent of the 
                                           
76
 D Beetham (2013), “Revisiting Legitimacy, Twenty Years on” in J Tankebe and A 
Liebling (eds), Legitimacy and Criminal Justice: An International Exploration, Oxford 
University Press, at 20 ff. 
77
 Barnett classified the legitimacy into two, and focused on the second one. Barnett, supra 
note 23, at 130. 
78
 Id., at 115, 116. 
79
 In his Frederic R. and Molly S. Kellogg Biennial Lecture in Jurisprudence, Raz contended 
that there is a difference between sovereignty and legitimacy and he further stated that 
sovereignty is the relationship between states while legitimacy is the relationship between 
the state and its subjects. The second Frederic R. and Molly S. Kellogg Biennial Lecture 
in Jurisprudence by Joseph Raz on the subject of “Sovereignty & Legitimacy: On the 
Changing Face of Law, Questions & Speculations” available at 
     <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VMC9u7PZZCo> last accessed on January 22, 
2018.  Even though legitimacy is asserted by „power-holders‟, Beetham argues that, it can 
be “improved by policy changes and institutional reform […as] legitimacy is best 
understood as a dynamic process of interaction or dialogue between states and their 
citizens, in which performance and legitimacy respond to each other.” Beetham, supra 
note 76, at 25, 28.  
80
 Macleod, supra note 31, at 66. 
81
 Id., at 67. Barnett, supra note 23, at 136. 
82
 Beccaria states that “wearied by living in an unending state of war and by a freedom 
rendered useless by the uncertainty of retaining it, they sacrifice a part of that freedom in 
order to enjoy what remains in security and calm. The sum of these portions of freedom 
sacrificed to the good of all makes up the sovereignty of the nation, and the sovereignty is 
the legitimate repository and administrator of these freedoms.” It is this Beccaria holds to 
be “the foundation of the sovereign‟s right to punish crimes.” Beccaria, supra note 21, at 
9, 10.  
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governed,‟ it could not be achieved both for theoretical83 and practical reasons. 
Barnett argues that, practically, there is no actual unanimous consent and Hardin 
describes it as “an impossible condition”.84 It is for such lack of actual 
unanimous consent that Barnett calls the notion of social contract a “fiction” and 
“fraud on the public”.85 
In search of alternative explanations for legitimacy, Hardin argues for a 
coordination theory or dual convention theory, i.e., a constitution is legitimate 
by acquiescence.86 The public acquiesces to a constitution “because it would be 
very difficult to organise what would de facto have to be a collective action to 
topple a going convention or to organise a new one”.87 The cost of changing the 
constitution becomes higher because of the inherent predicament of the social 
structure. However, he further argues that often “our interests are better served 
by acquiescing in the rule of that constitution than by attempting to change it”.88 
There is also a possible argument that a convention is legitimised by a 
subsequent („good‟) conduct of those who administer the constitution which 
remedies the initial defect.89 In this regard, the FDRE Constitution may be a 
good example in that, it cannot claim initial legitimacy for it missed out several 
essential power players in the constitutional making.90 However, it could have 
                                           
83
 Hardin distinguishes the notion of ordinary contract as we know from the contract in the 
„social contract‟ that contracts are about defined objects requiring quid pro quo obligation 
between equal parties, to be completed within a certain period, the terms of which are 
enforced by third parties. If a constitution is a contract, it is not this type; it is rather a 
“contract on what contract will mean” Hardin, supra note 24, at 291. 
84
 Consent to the constitutional making process is “non-existent and impossible to achieve.” 
Nor are there alternatives to consent. Barnett effectively disqualified the opportunity to 
vote as consent to obey the law because there are at least few who would oppose the 
proposition; he disqualified residency in the jurisdiction as consent to obey the law 
because the cost of relocation is so prohibitive; the consent of the founders is not binding 
on the present generation; and he showed that acquiescence is not consent. Finally, he 
contends that benefit received cannot be taken as consent, often, as it is not voluntary. 
Barnett, supra note 23, at 118-125, 135. Also see Hardin, supra note 24, at 293. Macleod, 
supra note 31, at 66. 
85
 Barnett, supra note 23, at 112, 113, 115, 118.  
86
 Hardin presents acquiescence as part of another theory – coordination theory – not 
contractian theory. Hardin, supra note 24, at 298 
87
 Id., at 297. 
88
 Id., at 298. 
89
 Elster, supra note 31, at 64. 
90 
Adem Kassie Abebe (2013), “From the „TPLF Constitution‟ to the „Constitution of the 
People of Ethiopia‟: Constitutionalism and Proposals for Constitutional Reform” in 
MKMbondenyi and TOjienda (eds), Constitutionalism and Democratic Governance in 
Africa: Contemporary Perspectives from Sub-Saharan Africa , PULP at 54-57. Also, see 
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made that „good‟ by containing provisions that promote and protect the interests 
of those groups missing out in the constitutional making, and enforcing those 
provisions in keeping with the constitutional promise.  
Yet, foundational legitimacy cannot be secured by complying with certain 
rules of standards for there were no a priori rules.91 Kelsen in his theory of state 
and law, argues that a sub-constitutional norm may be validated by its 
conformity to the constitution. The constitution cannot be validated; it is our 
presupposition. Likewise, Dunn argues that legitimacy is “a presupposition of 
every actually existing state”.92 Owing to factors including the practical-logical 
difficulty of showing such legitimacy, the debate on initial legitimation seems to 
imply that “power at some point is usurped or taken by force”.93 
2.3  Second level legitimacy 
After interrogating the social contract source of the binding nature of the 
constitution, Barnett goes on to classify the norms into those binding on the state 
and those binding on the individual.94 His enquiry of legitimacy focuses on sub-
constitutional norms adopted based on authority claimed from the constitution.95 
He argues that such legislation could be legitimate if it is seen as “a product of 
procedural assurances that legal commands are not unjust”.96 Justice is “the only 
principle” which, he contends, “everybody can be presumed to agree to”.97 In 
this manner, he shifts the debate on legitimacy, from one of foundational 
legitimacy to that of procedural fairness of the commands of the state claiming 
constitutional authority, and justice. He further argues that his proposed 
argument is not a particular type of theory of justice but stands “between 
validity and justice”.98 Dunn, on the other hand, connects legitimacy with 
                                                                                                            
Editorial of Addis Zemen Newspaper (Title in Amharic) July 2, 1991 “One that has to be 
taken from the Perspective of Public Interest,” [translation mine] at 2. 
91
 Elster, for instance, argues as the convention could not logically convene itself, the 
conventions both in Paris and Philadelphia were convened by those who were part of the 
problem to find a solution. However, once they called on the convention, their pre-
existing orders were not binding anymore. Elster, supra note 31, at 66, 67. This is 
absolutely different in the Ethiopian case. Both in the formation of the PMAC and FDR 
Ethiopia, the conventions could not be called by any external authority, but by the 
convention itself, the victor. The logical impossibility of the foundational legitimacy 
presented by Barnett fits here. Barnett, supra note 23, at 121. 
92
 Dunn, supra note 20, at 11. 
93
 Riley, supra note 21; Hardin, supra note 24, at 299; also see Kriegel, supra note 1, at 21-
24 
94
 Barnett, supra note 23, at 130. 
95
 Id., at 115. 
96
 Id., at 113. 
97
 Id., at 137. 
98
 Id., at 114. 
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democracy. He argues that legitimacy is not a matter of fact; it is rather a matter 
of judgment that constantly changes.99 For him, legitimacy is a “political 
decision” which is legitimized through democracy.100 Likewise, Macleod 
argues, legitimacy is based on democracy and justice, and in his subsequent 
discussion, the two notions merge in effect.101 
In the Kelsenian theory of validity, the sub-constitutional norm is valid in so 
far as such norm conforms to the legislation that is higher in hierarchy. For 
instance, in the Ethiopian context, a directive is valid if it is in conformity with 
the Regulations that authorises its adoption which in turn is validated if it is 
adopted in conformity with the proclamation. Finally, a proclamation is valid if 
it is adopted in conformity with the Constitution. This conformity is both 
procedural and substantive.  
Legitimacy has extra content other than rules of validity –according to 
Barnett, it must be “binding in conscience” of the individual.102 Barnett borrows 
a clause from the US Constitution and argues that in order for those laws to be 
binding on the ordinary citizen, such laws must be “necessary and proper”.103 In 
order for coercive laws to be binding on citizens, such laws must be „necessary‟ 
to protect the rights of others. However, such laws would be „proper‟ in so far as 
they do not violate the pre-existing rights of persons on whom they impose 
coercive duties.104 Such pre-existing rights, according to Barnett, are “natural 
rights”.105  
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 Dunn, supra note 20, at 8. 
100 
Id., at 9, 10. 
101
 Macleod, supra note 31, at 63 ff. 
102 
Barnett, supra note 23, at 113, 114, 142. 
103
 Id., at 127, 144. 
104
 Id., at 142 
105
 Earlier, he argues that if there is an assumption that the social contract is based on 
consent, then it presupposes that there is a pre-state and pre-law right called natural right. 
People need to have rights before the foundation of a legal system. Barnett, supra note 
23, at 136, 142. Donnelly rejects this assertion that “rights are social” as well as legal. 
They are “grounded not in the descriptive account of the psycho-biological needs but in a 
prescriptive account of human possibility.” [emphasis in the original.] Thus, in the 
absence of law, there can never be right. J Donnelly (2006), “Human Rights” in JS 
Dryzek, B Honig and A Phillips (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Political Theory, Oxford 
University Press, at 603. 
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3. Constitution and Constitutionalism: Structural Limitation on 
the Coercive Power of the State 
The constitution is a statement of the “self-conception” of society;106 it is an 
instrument of identity but it is also used as an instrument of asserting 
sovereignty at the national level.107 The very notion of constitution is having a 
limited government.108 Generally stated, the application of the constitution as 
limiting the power of the state is referred to as constitutionalism; it is applying 
the constitution in its entirety and being bound by it.109 The constitution ideally 
contains, among others, structure of the government, its powers and a bill of 
rights.110 Thus, the restriction on the power of the government is broadly 
categorised into structural and substantive. Structural limitations are the subject 
of this section while the substantive limitation (with regard to the bill of rights), 
is the subject of the next section. 
This section deals with structural limitation on the power of the state which is 
further classified into institutional and normative. The institutional structural 
division of state power among the three branches of government relates to 
competence. The normative structure relates to the structure of the constitutional 
principles and values, and how the bill of rights fits into that normative structure 
in the normative hierarchy.  
3.1 Institutional Structural Limitations 
The power of the government is apportioned among the three branches – 
principally between the legislature and the executive.111 This is essentially 
designed with intent to limit the abuse of state power against the people whom it 
is supposed to serve.112 Therefore, the structural framework is fundamental. 
Thus, one branch of the government does not intrude into the sphere of the 
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 Thornhill, supra note 46, at 10.  
107
 Kelsen (1949), supra note 33, at 258 – 259. The political theorists conveniently pass 
matters of local legitimacy of sovereignty to the constitutional document. Biersteker and 
Weber, supra note 9, at 9. 
108
 Lutz states that constitution is an instrument of justice and fairness to achieve the 
„common good‟. For Lutz, constitutionalism has three general elements – culture, power 
and justice. Lutz, supra note 2, at 11, 17, 18. G. Sartori (1962), “Constitutionalism: A 
Preliminary Discussion”, 56 The Am PolSci Rev 853, at 855, 860. 
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Id., at 26, 37. 
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 Kelsen (1949), supra note 33, at 260 – 269. Thornhill, supra note 46, at 10-11. Sartori, 
supra note 108, at 856. 
111
 For detailed discussion see, CM Fombad (2016), “An Overview of Separation of Powers 
under Modern African Constitutions” in CM Fombad (Ed), The Separation of Powers in 
African Constitutionalism, Oxford University Press; Kelsen (1949), supra note 33, at 269 
- 272. 
112
 Bhagwat, supra note 21, at 61. 
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other. This structural aspect of the restriction of power also includes matters, 
such as, jurisdiction or competence.113 
The FDRE Constitution under Art 55(5) provides that the House of Peoples‟ 
Representatives is specifically authorised to adopt a penal code. Thus, should 
the government decide to criminalise certain conducts, such criminalisation 
should be included in such penal code.114 The Constitution under Art 51 lists the 
power of the Federal Government. As can be understood from the reading, all 
administrative and regulatory power is reserved for the Federal Government. Art 
55(1) is a general legislative power provision in that, the House has the power to 
legislate on matters that are reserved for the Federal Government. Thus, the 
House adopts almost all legislation based on this provision.115 Several of those 
areas reserved for the Federal Government on which the House may adopt 
legislation are specifically provided for under Art 55(2) and the subsequent 
provisions. However, there is no criminal regulatory power reserved for the 
Federal Government under Art 51.  Thus, Art 55(1) cannot be understood to 
authorise the House to adopt penal provisions to enforce administrative matters. 
The legislative power of the House is different from the administrative and 
regulatory power of the Federal Government. Leaving that argument for 
constitutional lawyers, it is evident that if the House is given the power to adopt 
a penal code, and it is historically evident that such penal code is of civil law 
tradition, which is comprehensive, there is no reason for the Constitution to 
authorise the adoption of other penal provisions in piecemeal legislation outside 
the penal code.  If new things arise and a new provision needs to be added, or a 
provision needs to be changed, it is the penal code that needs to be amended. 
Further, because of economy of words in a constitution, it does not authorise a 
given conduct twice.  
The adoption of regulatory provisions may be seen in light of the provisions 
of the Criminal Code, Art 3. Historically, it is meant to authorise the adoption of 
a regulation that may be adopted in the manner Book III, on Petty Offences, is 
                                           
113
 Fombad, supra note 111, at 61.  
114
 It may also be contended that such legislation the Constitution referred to as a „penal 
code,‟ may not be named otherwise, such as, „criminal code.‟  
115
 See, for instance, Banking Business Proclamation No 592/2008, Value Added Tax 
Proclamation No 285/2002, Federal Tax Administration Proclamation No 983/2016, The 
Ethiopian Federal Government Procurement and Property Administration Proclamation 
No 649/2009, and Commercial Registration and Licencing Proclamation No 980/2016, 
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written.116 Those regulatory proclamations may provide for the operative facts 
(those prohibited or proscribed conducts), which, based on the principle of 
legality, are required to be published in the Negarit Gazeta. However, 
administrative penal provisions cannot be outside of the Penal/Criminal Code. 
The joint reading of the Criminal Code Arts 3 and 343, or Arts 3 and 433, or 
Arts 3 and 434 supports such position. 
3.2 Normative Structural Limitation 
A constitution is the supreme law, and it includes provisions that have direct and 
indirect application. Provisions of a constitution that have indirect application 
also put the sub-constitutional norms in a certain order. Those norms relating to 
the structure of constitutional and sub-constitutional norms are called postulates 
(principles).117Avila classifies postulates into hermeneutic, normative and 
applicative postulates.118 Their application may be seen both in the legislative as 
well as in the adjudication process regarding the content and limitation of the 
bill of rights.119 
One of the most important hermeneutic postulates is the postulate of the 
“unity of legal order”, which also includes the postulates of coherence, 
consistency and hierarchy under it.120 These postulates require that the 
constitutional norm at the top should cohere to each other and all sub-
constitutional norms should conform to such constitutional norm. Some of the 
applicative postulates include proportionality, reasonableness and prohibition of 
excess.121 Avila argues that weighing is a non-specific postulate as it is “void of 
substantive or formal criteria” much broader than „proportionality‟ and 
„reasonableness‟.122 
In this regard, Art 9(1) specifically provides that the “Constitution is the 
supreme law of the land. Any law, customary practice or a decision of an organ 
of state or a public official which contravenes this Constitution shall be of no 
effect.” This provision asserts the unity of the legal order. Likewise, Art 85 
provides that “any organ of Government shall, in the implementation of the 
Constitution, other laws and public policies be guided by the principles and 
objectives specified under” Chapter Ten. The bill of rights is guided by the 
jurisprudence and practice of the international bill of rights both for the 
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determination of their content and such methods of interpretation.123 Therefore, 
the constitutional adjudication process is guided by those postulates and the 
House is required to comply with those competence rules and normative 
structural limitations.  
4. Exercising (Sovereign) Authority  
The doctrine of sovereignty is developed to justify the exercise of power, 
although it relates to limited power (authority). Normatively described, it is the 
violence power of the state which is expressed in areas, such as, criminal law, 
tax law and conscription.124 In the modern notion of state, sovereignty is said to 
be vested in the people who delegate their representatives to act on their behalf, 
and such delegated power is exercised through legislation. Thus, criminal 
lawmaking (criminalisation) is one important consequence of exercise of 
sovereign authority.  
4.1. Criminalisation and the common (public) good 
Criminalisation is declaration of conduct criminal. Criminal law is the most 
intrusive form of state action and is revealing of the coercive nature of the 
state.125  Criminal norms are conditional statements having both the operative 
facts and the consequence;126 the operative facts state the prohibited conduct and 
their violation entails the consequence, a punishment. As such, they give the 
individual a choice; thus, conducts complying with criminal norms are not 
normally taken as coerced actions.127 Beccaria states that men are moved more 
by the motive to avoid pain than by the pursuit of pleasure;128 therefore, 
compliance is only for the purpose of avoiding the consequent pain for violation 
of a criminal norm. 
Sovereignty is manifested in making laws, establishing institutions, and 
imposing sanctions. It is so big a power that without a proper limit, it is “a 
slippery slope into authoritarianism”.129 More so, the criminal law, the most 
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128
 Beccaria, supra note 21, at 31, 48, 49, 63. 
129 
Kriegel, supra note 1, at 16. 
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effective social control tool,130 is always a suspect for unjustifiably limiting the 
rights of the individual.131 Whatever the justification, the state claims that it uses 
the criminal law for the „common good‟,132 which is the ultimate public good. 
The common good, as defined by Beccaria, is the peaceful social existence of 
individuals.133 In order for criminalisation to be legitimate, it needs to meet both 
the substantive and procedural requirements of legislation, and must comply 
with limitations on such power of the government. Therefore, the principle of 
legality, for instance, requires that both the operative facts and the consequence 
be declared.   
4.2.Doctrinal limitations to criminalisation 
The structural limitation discussed under section 3, are institutional and 
normative structure. The structural limitation on the power of the government 
had once extended to other normative aspects of constitutions. Thus, a bill of 
rights used to be taken to have the same structural effect. This section rather 
focuses on the doctrinal limitations on the criminalisation power of the state.  
Criminalisation is normative declaration of criminal conduct.134 The state 
does not have a free hand to criminalise conduct at whim. In the positivisation 
of the criminal law, conduct may be criminalised when two conditions are met. 
The positive condition for criminalisation is that the legal interest must be one 
that demands the protection of the criminal law, and the negative requirement is 
that, the purpose that requires the protection of the criminal law cannot be 
achieved by other means, such as, administrative measures and civil actions.135 
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These principles are incorporated as legislative promise into Art 1 of the 
Criminal Code. Such legislative promise is made by the legislature and there is a 
risk that it may be changed at the will of the legislature itself. Therefore, the 
limitations on the criminalising power of the state must be found in a higher 
norm, the Constitution. In addition to the formal limitations discussed earlier, 
the substantive restriction highlighted in the following section is important.  
The enquiry into the justifiability of the state‟s use of its coercive power 
relates both to the content of the conduct that is criminalised and the 
consequences for violations.136 However, there is also a legitimate enquiry into 
the justifiability of the lawmaking process. This relates to the validity of the law 
and whether procedural justice is achieved.137 
5. Fundamental Rights as Limits to Sovereignty  
Earlier theorists considered the social contract, natural rights and other premises 
as pre-state and pre-law, which justify the right exercised in the formation of the 
state.138 However, as rights are social, some argue that they cannot exist in the 
pre-state.139 In a modern nation state, the constitution is the one that creates and 
legitimizes the state while it is also meant to limit the power of the state. This 
section deals with the bill of rights as both structural and substantive limitations 
to the power of the state.  
5.1. Bill of rights as structural limitation on the power of the state 
The notion of a constitution is developed as part of the project of a limited 
government. The concept of separation of power is introduced in order to 
achieve this limit on government power. Thus, when the bill of rights was 
proposed as amendments to the US Constitution, for instance, there had been 
objection to them because the structural limit on the government was believed to 
be sufficient.140  
The opponents of a bill of rights had argued that state power delegated to the 
state is enumerated power; thus, it is inherently limited that it needs no further 
limit.141 Because the government‟s power was believed to be limited to those 
expressly provided for in the constitution, the introduction of a bill of rights 
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rather was said to be „dangerous‟ in that whatever is not provided for in the bill 
of rights might be deemed to be allowed.142 There had been a similar objection 
to the introduction of the bill of rights at the French Assembly based on the 
assertion that granting rights to citizens is dangerous. It had been counter-argued 
that the bill of rights is a restatement of the truth and “the truth can never be 
dangerous”.143 The proponents of the introduction of the bill of rights won the 
debate in both countries, and a bill of rights is incorporated both in the US and 
the French constitutions.144 
The content of the amendments introduced to the American constitution give 
the impression that they are about structural limitation rather than individual 
autonomy.145 As stated by Bhagwat, the first amendment provides that 
“congress shall make no law…” negatively impacting three major activities, 
including the commonly known “abridgement of the freedom of speech or the 
press”.146 Other subsequent amendments, the second amendment on the right to 
bear and keep arms, the third amendment on privacy, the fourth amendment on 
protection against unreasonable search and seizure, are as good as the structural 
limitations on the power of the government because they focus on the collective 
exercise of the right to limit their government and not as rights for the individual 
autonomy.147  
Those rights incorporated in the Fifth Amendment to the Eighth Amendment 
of the US Constitution address matters in the administration of the criminal 
justice system, such as, due process, prohibition of double jeopardy, self-
incrimination clause, confrontation and the compulsory process, which were not 
considered serving a different purpose.148 These rights require the government 
“when employing its ultimate coercive power” that it does not abuse its power 
by unfairly targeting individuals or not to use “cruel or unusual punishment.”149 
5.2. Bill of rights as substantive limitation on the coercive power of the 
state 
5.2.1 In the context of adjudication – The principle theory of rights 
Kriegel makes a distinction between „absolute power‟ and „power without 
limitation‟ and she argues that sovereignty is absolute power; but it is not a 
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power without limitation. The “omnipotence of the state” is limited by law 
which meanwhile ensures individual rights.150 Today, the bill of rights is seen as 
a substantive limitation to the right to legislative power. Political theorists see 
the bill of rights as recognising the rights of the individual to be free from 
government coercion within a certain sphere.151 Legal theorists, on the other 
hand, see the bill of rights further as legal principles within the constitutional 
framework. As such, they opine that fundamental rights are principles.152 
Constitutional principles are not only those that are directly applicable rules 
but also normative judgments,153 such as, the bill of rights. Those normative 
judgments or principles have unique properties that distinguish them from other 
norms that they are „optimisation commands‟.154 When principles are described 
as optimization commands, it means, they are “applicable in several degrees” or 
that they impose the “duty of realisation to its maximum extent but only to its 
necessary extent”.155 Principles are not necessarily different from rules in terms 
of content that they may have both the operative facts and consequences, except 
they are higher level abstractions.156 However, they are different from other 
norms, at least, in their application and in the event of normative conflict. 
Alexy, in his „principle theory‟ thesis argues that, fundamental rights need to 
be treated as principles because principles require optimisation and during 
collision they further require weighing each principle against the other.157 Avila 
disagrees with this argument in that weighing is “not exclusive method of 
principle application”; nor would principles have “weight dimension”.158 He 
asserts that most principles are silent regarding their own weight. Weight is not 
“empirical quality of principles” nor is it related to the norm; it rather relates to 
“the reasons and goals which they refer to” which the judge values.159 However, 
elsewhere, he describes how conflict is resolved in a manner showing principles 
actually have weight. He states that when two principles collide, they are not 
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applied as „all or nothing; and “the principle with relative higher weight will 
superpose” without nullifying the other.160 
There is a general consensus that fundamental rights have to be seen as 
principles.161 Whether we are weighing the principles or their goal, there is 
consensus on the method of weighing. Gardbaum states a two-step approach  –
first identifying the right implicated and infringed, and determining the scope of 
the right.162 In this step, he discusses specific and general limitation clauses 
including the positive and negative obligations of the state regarding a particular 
right. It is to be noted that criminalisation involves classical state-citizen 
relationship which requires a state to carry a higher burden in order to have its 
policy maintained.  
The second step is considering the relevance and strength of the conflicting 
public policy that is said to implicate the rights of the individual.163 This step 
involves a three-prong analysis of the principle of proportionality –suitability of 
the means used by the state, whether the means used is necessary and the least 
intrusive, and whether the means is proportional considering the relative weight 
of the right and the conflicting public policy.164 
Therefore, when the state adopts a particular public policy that implicates 
fundamental rights, the adjudicating body, after identifying the conflicting 
fundamental rights, and determining the scope of such right, evaluates the 
relative importance of the two principles. Often, when the state adopts a public 
policy, it is alleged to be for the “common good.” One such public policy is 
criminalisation of conduct. The constitutional adjudicating organ first identifies 
the right that is implicated by the legislation that criminalises a given conduct. It 
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could be the right to equality, free speech, the right to pursue a livelihood of 
one‟s choice, freedom from particular type of punishment, etc.  
For instance, Art 433 of the Criminal Code165 criminalises doing business 
without a license.166 In this regard, Art 49 of the Commercial Registration and 
Business Licensing Proclamation No 980/2016 provides for punishments of 
various degrees. For instance, sub-art (2) provides that: 
 “any person engaged in business activity without having a valid license or 
any business person who has been engaged in a business out of the scope of 
his business license shall, without prejudice to the confiscation of 
merchandise, service provision and manufacturing equipments [sic], be 
punished with fine from Birr 150,000 (one hundred fifty thousand) to Birr 
300,000 (three hundred thousand) and with rigorous imprisonment from 7 
(seven) years to 15 (fifteen) years”.167 
In order to evaluate whether such penal provision should be maintained, the 
first step would be identifying the constitutional right implicated by such 
provision and determining the scope of such right. This provision may have 
implicated several other constitutional rights but what readily comes to mind is 
the right of individuals to engage in livelihood of their choice. Art 41(1) of the 
FDRE Constitution provides that “every Ethiopian has the right to engage freely 
in economic activity and to pursue a livelihood of his choice anywhere within 
the national territory.” Because this provision gives the impression that it 
focuses on the rights to movement within the national territory, we need to read 
further the provisions of sub-art (2) which provides that “every Ethiopian has 
the right to choose his or her means of livelihood, occupation and profession.” 
The adjudicating organ needs to define the scope of this right and whether there 
is any limitation to it, be it general or specific.  
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The second step would be counterweighing this right of the individual to 
engage in livelihood of his choice and the state‟s policy of maintaining legality 
in the commercial activity by requiring everyone to engage in business activities 
only upon securing a „valid license‟ at the pain of such criminal punishment. 
This second step, involves the three-prong approach of weighing the two 
conflicting principles.  
The first test is whether such „severe‟ criminal punishment on top of the 
administrative measure authorised in the proclamation is an appropriate means 
of achieving the state‟s end. The end the legislation is meant to achieve is “to 
put in place a fair, modern, fast and accessible system of commercial 
registration and business licensing services”.168 There is no justification 
provided in the statute regarding the need to criminalise such conduct. The 
closest statement to justification states that it is meant “to support commercial 
registration and licensing activities with modern technology in order to make 
them suitable for data management, to combat illegality”.169 [emphasis added.] 
Criminalisation appears to be remotely relevant to the state‟s objective stated in 
the Commercial Registration and Licensing Proclamation. 
The second test is whether this criminal punishment is necessary, in addition 
to those administrative measures (that are the least intrusive means to achieve 
the state‟s end). This requirement may be seen in light of the doctrinal 
limitations to criminalisation, the negative requirement, ultima ratio, i.e., 
whether the state‟s objective may be achieved by other less intrusive means, 
such as, administrative measures and civil actions. There is no evidence which 
shows that the administrative measures were not sufficient to achieve the 
objective of the state.  
The third test relates to whether such restriction to the right of the individual 
–to engage in livelihood of his choice at the pain of such „severe‟ punishment– 
is proportional to the state‟s public policy objective. In order for the adjudicator 
to maintain such penal provision, it must find all these three points in the 
affirmative. Otherwise, the legislation would be struck down as unconstitutional, 
assuming there is a strong constitutional review.  
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5.2.2 In the context of legislation – Legislative rationality   
The constitution contains provisions that have direct application as well as 
normative judgments. Those provisions that have direct application limit the 
power of the government. However, the provisions that contain normative 
judgments help the lawmaker to adopt rational public policy. Sieckmann argues 
that, in order for rationality to guide the lawmaker in the law-making process, 
such requirement needs to have a constitutional base.170 This appears to fit 
Barnett‟s two level discussion on constitutional legitimacy wherein he shifted 
his quest for legitimacy from the constitution to sub-constitutional norms on 
account that the constitution binds the government while it is those sub-
constitutional norms adopted based on such constitution that bind the citizen.171 
Sieckmann argues that rationality has a constitutional foundation at least for 
“the application of fundamental rights principles”.172 His argument is based on 
seven theses. Aligned with the principle theory of Alexy and Gardbaum, his first 
thesis is based on the assumption that fundamental rights are provided for in the 
constitution. And therefore, he opines that “constitutional law includes not only 
directly applicable norms, but also ideals or principles that figure as normative 
judgments in the procedures of balancing”.173 His second thesis follows from his 
first thesis of rationality of legislation that “the legislature is the primary 
addressee of the requirement to balance constitutional principles”.174 This is 
made evident in Fuller‟s „the inner morality of law‟,175 or that of the German 
notion of the „duty to reflect‟.176 
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His third thesis is that the construction of “fundamental rights as principles to 
balance against competing principles is a requirement of democracy itself”.177 It 
is discussed in the adjudication aspect of the construction of the bill of rights 
(which is also part of the first thesis) that when principles collide, the principle 
with a relative higher weight would superpose. In this process, it is evident that 
there is evaluation of competing interests. Sieckmann further states that, this 
third thesis is based on two assumptions.  
The first assumption, which is also his fourth thesis, is that democracy 
requires taking into account all relevant interests and balance them in order to 
achieve a reasonably agreeable solution.178 In a democratic process, no relevant 
interest is to be disregarded. All contradictory interests could not be addressed, 
and thus a choice would be made by weighing those conflicting interests and 
decisions are made by majority.179 It is stated that, often, fundamental rights are 
provided for in the constitution and they are normative restrictions to the 
legislative power of the state.  
There is always weighing of the conflicting principles; however, those 
standards of restriction come in different forms based on the nature of the right 
that is implicated. Avila enumerates them as proportionality, reasonableness and 
prohibition of excess.180 The US Supreme Court, on the other hand, developed 
three level of scrutiny –strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational basis 
scrutiny.181 Thus, the second assumption of Sieckmann‟s third thesis, which is 
also his fifth thesis, is that, “fundamental rights are most important interests […] 
that legislation must necessarily take into account”.182 
He further asserts that the connection with the demands of rationality of 
legislation follows from two further assumptions –proportionality and normative 
decision. Thus, in perfect conformity with the principle theory of rights, his 
sixth thesis is that “the balancing of fundamental rights or other constitutional 
principles must follow the principle of proportionality”.183 As stated earlier, 
when two principles collide, we resolve the conflict by weighing the relative 
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weight of the conflicting principles. Proportionality is used to assess the 
counterweight between the means and the end. Sieckmann‟s seventh thesis is 
that “the principle of proportionality presents […] requirements of rationality 
respecting normative decision or judgments”.184 Stated otherwise, balancing and 
proportionality are methods of rational decision making. And the legislature 
makes such evaluation not once, but, continuously.185 However, as legislative 
balancing of proportionality and review of public policy are inadequate for the 
effective enforcement of the bill of rights, resort to the adjudicative process is 
natural.186 
6. The Practice of Criminalisation in Ethiopia  
The criminal law is found scattered in various legislation. The 2004 Criminal 
Code is a continental criminal code that is said to have contained criminal 
matters comprehensively.187 When the 1957 Penal Code was revised into the 
2004 Criminal Code, it is designed to include all possible criminal matters and 
in not few cases, with increased punishment. This is assisted by a sentencing 
guideline that „help‟ increase the sentence from what is provided for in the 
Criminal Code.188 
6.1 Other laws that contain penal provisions 
Several other laws contain penal provisions, either modifying the provisions of 
the Criminal Code, or introducing new penal provisions. We can use different 
categories for convenience. The first category includes special penal legislation, 
such as, the Vagrancy Control Proclamation No 384/2004, Corruption Crimes 




 Generally, see, Wintgens (2002), supra note 176; AM Arenas (2016), “Theoretical and 
Procedural Aspects of the Evaluation of Public Policies” in AN Martin and MM de 
Morales Romero (eds), Towards a Rational Legislative Evaluation in Criminal Law 
(Springer,) at 3 ff. 
186
 AD Oliver-Lalana (2016), “Due Post-Legislative Process? On the Lawmakers‟ 
Constitutional Duties of Monitoring and Revision” in K Meßerschmidt and AD Oliver-
Lalana (eds), supra note 179, at 257. 
187
 One of the reasons for the adoption of the Code was the desire “to adopt a comprehensive 
code by assembling the various criminal provisions published in the Negarit Gazeta in a 
disintegrated manner.” Preface of the Criminal Code, para 4.  
188
 Art 88(4) of the Criminal Code authorises the Federal Supreme Court to adopt sentencing 
manual “in order to ensure the correctness and uniformity of sentencing”. The manual 
increases the sentence that is already fixed in the Criminal Code. Simeneh Kiros Assefa 
and Cherinet Hordofa Wetere (2008 E.C.), Criminal Investigation, Prosecution and 
Litigation Manual (in Amharic), United Printers; Nuru Seid (2016), „Problems of the 
Revised Sentencing Guideline No 2/2006 E.C.‟ (in Amharic), 5 Ethiopian Bar Review 
119, at 133. 
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Proclamation No 881/2015, Anti-Terrorism Proclamation No 652/2009, 
Prevention and Suppression of Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism 
Proclamation No 657/2009, Computer Crimes Proclamation No 958/2016 and 
Prevention and Suppression of Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of 
Migrants Proclamation No 909/2015.  
The second category includes administrative regulatory legislation adopted 
by the House of Peoples‟ Representatives in Proclamations containing penal 
provisions. They are diverse and need to be put under different sub-categories:  
(a) legislation governing financial business, such as, Banking Business 
Proclamation No 592/2008 and Micro-Financing Business Proclamation No 
626/2009;  
(b) legislation governing commercial activities, such as, Commercial 
Registration and Business License Proclamation No 980/2016, Trade 
Competition and Consumers Protection Proclamation No 813/2013; Ethiopian 
Commodity Exchange Proclamation No 550/2007; and Coffee Quality Control 
and Marketing Proclamations No 602/2008;  
(c) legislation governing expression and the media, such as, Broadcasting 
Services Proclamation No 533/2007, Protection of the Media and Access to 
Information Proclamation No 590/2008;  
(d) tax laws, such as, Value Added Tax Proclamation No 285/2002, Income 
Tax Proclamation 286/2002, Excise Tax Proclamation No 307/2002, Turn Over 
Tax Proclamation No 308/2002, Tax Administration Proclamation No 
983/2016;  
(e) legislation governing public property and finance, such as, Federal 
Government of Ethiopia Financial Administration Proclamation No 648/2009, 
and Ethiopian Federal Government Procurement and Property Administration 
Proclamation No 649/2009; (e) various legislation, such as, transport legislation, 
environmental regulation legislation, coffee quality control.189 
The criminal law making power of the House of Peoples‟ Representatives 
emanates from Art 55(5) of FDRE Constitution on the basis of which the 
Criminal Code is adopted. However, there are several penal legislation or 
legislation containing penal provisions adopted by invoking Art 55(1) of the 
FDRE Constitution in the preambles of the proclamations. Such laws, for 
instance, include the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation No 652/2009, Banking 
Business Proclamation No 592/2008, Revised Anti-Corruption Special 
Procedure and Rules of Evidence Proclamation No 434/2005, and Prevention 
                                           
189 
The diverse nature of the laws that contain penal provisions may be illustrated by 
Transport Proclamation No 468/2005; Copyright and Neighbouring Rights Proclamation 
No 410/2004; Environmental Pollution Control Proclamation No 300/2002; 
Development, Conservation and Utilisation of Wildlife Proclamation No 541/2007; 
Biosafety Proclamation No 655/2009; and Census Proclamation No 449/2005. 
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and Suppression of Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism 
Proclamation No 657/2009.  
6.2  Subsidiary rules 
Various Council of Ministers Regulations and agency directives include penal 
provisions which raise a host of issues. The first and most important subject 
relates to delegation of criminal lawmaking power. For instance, Art 2(1) of the 
Money Laundering Proclamation No 657/2009, provides for a list of 
“accountable persons” that are (under Art 17) required to give information 
regarding their clients and/or report suspicious transactions at the pain of 
criminal punishment. However, the Financial Intelligence Centre is expressly 
authorised to modify this list in a newspaper having national circulation (Art 
22).  
There are also indirect delegations. For instance, Art 58(7) of the Banking 
Business Proclamation No 592/2008 provides that “[a]ny person who 
contravenes or obstructs the provisions of this Proclamation or regulations or 
directives issued to implement this Proclamation shall be punished with a fine 
up to Birr 10,000 and with an imprisonment up to three years.” This shows that 
the Council of Ministers or National Bank of Ethiopia unduly defines the facts 
constituting crime.  
For instance, the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Bench in ERCA v. Daniel 
took the Directive adopted by the National Bank of Ethiopia (published in 
English), as the ground of prohibition and punished the defendant based on the 
Proclamation.190 This raises matters of clarity of the conduct that is prohibited. 
The Regulations or the Directive is not, usually, adopted having criminal 
responsibility in mind. However, the court makes use of such directives for the 
determination of the scope of the criminal law. This borders normative 
criminalisation and the actual enforcement of the criminal law.  
As directives are not published in the official Negarit Gazeta, the other major 
concern relates to the manner of declaration of the criminal norm. Article 2 of 
the Criminal Code provides for the principle of legality, which obviously also 
requires that the criminal law need to be published in the official Negarit 
Gazeta.191 There are also other provisions affirming the modalities of 
                                           
190 
Ethiopian Revenue and Customs Authority v Daniel Mekonnen (Cassation File No 43781, 
21 July 2010/ Hamle 14, 2002 Ethiopian Calendar), Decisions of the Cassation Division 
of the Federal Supreme Court, Volume 10, pp. 345-349)   
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 Federal Negarit Gazeta Establishment Proclamation No 3/1995, Art 2(1), establishes the 
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publication. Art 343 of the Criminal Code, for instance, provides that “[w]here a 
crime is committed in breach of legislation issued by an authorised pubic organ 
in accordance with the law and duly published in the Federal Negarit Gazeta 
[…] concerning the control or protection of the fiscal or economic interests of 
the State, the punishment shall be determined in accordance with the principles 
in this Code.” However, in practice, such requirement is shrugged off and 
directives are given legal effect.192  
This shows the practice of blanket criminalisation wherein the criminalised 
conduct is not clear at all. It also indicates the extent to which the universe of 
the criminal law is fast expanding; i.e., the scope of conducts is expanding, often 
the new ones are not justified;193 punishments are constantly increased,194 
criminal rules are adopted by agencies on delegation, and the court is (with 
regard to interpretation and application of the criminal law) resorting to using 
„materials‟ that are not legal rules published in the official Negarit Gazeta. The 
lawmaker criminalises conducts far broader than that is necessary and justified 
under the circumstances. Some of the legal interests could have been better 
protected by administrative action than by criminal law, such as, tax collection 
and commercial registration.  
Under settings which allow such criminal laws, the lawmaker fails to 
discharge its constitutional obligation to legislate, and in some instances, it 
abdicates its obligation by delegating criminal law making power to the 
executive. Blanket criminal rules violate the principle of legality; and there are 
criminal provisions that violate the principle of conduct and of personal 
responsibility by imputing criminal liability to another person, such as, company 
                                                                                                            
otherwise means, it prohibits retroactive application of the criminal law. Simeneh Kiros 
Assefa (2017), „Methods and Manners of Interpretation of Criminal Norms‟ 11 Mizan 
Law Review 88, 104 - 107. 
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 ERCA v Daniel, supra note 190.  
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For instance, Commercial Registration Proc No 980/2016, Art 49(4) punishes transferring 
“business licence to third party by way of sale, lease, donation or in a similar fashion” 
with fine from Birr 50,000 to Birr 100,000 and rigorous imprisonment from 5 to 10 
years. However, if the transfer was made to a foreign national, the punishment would be 
fine from Birr 200,000 to 300,000 and rigorous imprisonment from 7 to 15 years. 
194
 Engaging in ordinary commercial activities without a license is made a criminal conduct 
in Commercial Registration and Business Licensing Proclamation No 67/1997 as part of 
the trade regime reform. Thus, a person who engages in commercial activities without 
having a valid license would be punished with fine equal to double the revenue earned, 
and with imprisonment from 3 to 5 years (Art 46/1). However, the punishments are 
significantly increased in Commercial Registration and Business License Proclamation 
No 686/2010 (Art 60/1). Thus, those conducts were made punishable with rigorous 
imprisonment from 7 to 15 years, fine from Birr 150,000 to 300,000 and confiscation of 
production or delivery equipment. This is maintained in Art 49 of the current 
Commercial Registration and Business License Proclamation No 980/2016. 
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managers, and violate the principle of culpability by introducing strict criminal 
liability. Such presentation of the criminal law gives the impression that the 
lawmaker is not bound by any rule as long as it adopts a criminal rule. It appears 
to have given the state a freehand to use the criminal law to achieve any state 
purpose, which otherwise are not meant to protect legal good.  
In the normal course of things, one would expect the legislature would 
discuss any bill for conformity with the Constitution, its jurisdictional matters 
and the bill of rights, as well as in order to make a better legislation.195 There is 
no record which shows that such discussions were made on legislation 
containing penal provisions, either as a penal legislation or administrative 
provision containing penal provisions,. In fact, the preparatory materials for the 
administrative legislations containing penal provisions do not indicate the 
rationale behind the penal provisions.196 
The lawmaking process appears to be skewed because any administrative 
agency can draw a bill on which it claims competence and submit it to the 
Council of Ministers. The bill is then sent to the House of Peoples‟ 
Representatives, which refers it to the appropriate Standing Committee.197 
Often, the Standing Committee recommends for adoption of a bill into law with 
editorial changes. Once, it is presented to the full House, it appears to be an up 
or down vote. Owing to the institutional gaps in constitutional litigation and 
practice, Ethiopia does not seem to have a chance to correct legislative missteps. 
                                           
195
 The “Brief Explanatory Note on Freedom of the Media and Access to Information Bill”, 
which was later adopted as Proclamation No 590/2008, and which adopted the bill of 
rights interpretation method. However it is not faithfully complied with.   
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See for instance, “Minutes of Meeting of the Economic Affairs and Legal Affairs 
Standing Committees with Resource Persons Regarding the Draft Bill on Value Added 
Tax 7 November 2001” (in Amharic); “Minutes of the Public Hearing Organised by the 
House of Peoples‟ Representatives Commercial Affairs Standing Committee on the 
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“Minutes of Public Hearing Organised by Trade and Industry Affairs Standing 
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The rules governing legislation are the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia House of 
Peoples‟ Representatives Working Procedure and Members‟ Code of Conduct 
(Amendment) Proclamation No 470/2005 and the House of Peoples‟ Representatives 
Rules of Procedure and Members‟ Code of Conduct Regulation No 6/2015. These 
legislation rules were adopted by virtue of Art 59(2) of the FDRE Constitution. The most 
important legislative rule governing a broad range of pre-legislative activities is the 
Council of Ministers Working Directive 1996 (E.C., in Amharic). It governs initiation of 
bills and adoption procedure before the Council of Ministers, the single most important 
source of bills. 




Sovereignty is a supreme power of the state which includes criminalisation. The 
doctrine of sovereignty and the power of criminalisation are not unlimited. The 
doctrine of sovereignty has inherent limitation on such power demanding 
legitimacy of the power and the manner in which such power is exercised. As 
sovereignty is constituted in and vested on the state by a constitution, the latter 
also contains restrictions that are both formal and substantive. The substantive 
restrictions are the bill of rights which are required to be taken as principles. 
When there is conflict between public policy and a fundamental right, a specific 
method of interpretation is adopted, in order to determine whether the intended 
measure is appropriate, necessary and proportional. This is normally adopted in 
adjudication context; however, taking the final consequences into consideration, 
the legislator needs to adopt such method into consideration.  
The doctrine of sovereignty is vague in the Ethiopian Constitution, and in 
effect, it is not surprising if one holds reservation regarding the legitimacy of the 
criminal law. However, the criminal lawmaking power of the HoPR is justified 
by Art 55(5) of the Constitution, which is not complied with. The criminal law 
takes different forms and its reach is expanding contrary to almost all principles. 
This might be the result of gaps in the lawmaking process, including 
parliamentary debate. There is also the need for examination of the legislative 
power in light of the issues discussed in the preceding sections of this article. 
The fact that the criminal lawmaking power of the HoPR appears to be 
unlimited, along with other factors, give the impression that there is „unjustified‟ 
use of criminal law.                                                                                               ■ 
 
 
